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I INTRODUCTION 
What can a court do when faced with a plaintiff whose remedy is ostensibly 
time barred despite the plaintiff not knowing all or some of the facts giving rise to the 
cause of action? Two general answers are open, and both relate to the meaning 
attached to the phrase that time runs from the "date on which the cause of action 
accrued". ' The first approach regards this as laying down a statutory test of when time 
starts to run. This test may either be that a cause of action has accrued upon the 
occurrence of the facts constituting the cause of action,
2 or upon the plaintiff's 
knowledge or reasonable discoverability of those facts.
3 The second approach regards 
accrual as a matter for the common law.
4 It argues that whether the accrual of a cause 
of action requires the plaintiff's knowledge or reasonable discoverability of facts 
depends on if this can be accommodated within the substantive cause of action. 
5 
As it 
is a matter for the common law the application of the rule by analogy to other fact 
scenarios will be possible where knowledge can similarly be placed within the cause 
of action. 
In Murray v Morel & Co Ltd the majority of the Supreme Couii declined the 
appellant ' s submission the Limitation Act 1950 should be interpreted as laying down 
a knowledge or discoverability based test, or a so called general doctrine of 
reasonable discoverability.6 At the same time the Court did not wish to overrule the 
earlier Court of Appeal decisions in S v G and Searle which held that reasonable 
1 Limitation Act 1950, s 4(1) and used throughout the Limitation Act 1950. Similar language has been 
used in limitation statutes throughout the Commonwealth, see Nicholas J Mullany "Limitation of 
Actions and Latent Damage: An Australian Perspective" ( 1991) 54 MLR 216, 216. 
2 Cartledge & Ors v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [I 963] I All ER 341 , 343 [Cartledge]; Pirelli General Cable 
Works Ltd v Oscar Fable & Ors [ I 983] 2 AC I [Pirelli]. 
3 Kam/oops v Nielsen [1984] 2 SCR 2 [Kam/oops] ; Central Trust Company v Rafuse [1986] 2 SCR 147 
lRafuse]. 
fnvercargill City Council v Hamlin [ I 994] 3 NZLR 513 (CA) [ Hamlin (CA)] ; [ 1996] I NZLR 513 
(PC) [Hamlin (PC); Sparham-Souter v Town and Country Developments [1976] QB 858 [Sparham-
Souter]. This is not the only way the common law has dealt with latent damage. In the context of 
professional negligence, it has been recognised that in cases of contingent liability, no loss occurs until 
the contingency arises, see Thom v Davys Burton [2008] NZSC 65 . 
5 This approach is not inconsistent with an occurrence based test. See the discussion at Part III C New 
Zealand. 
6 Murray v Morel & Co Ltd [2007] 3 NZLR 721 (Gault J dissenting) [Murray]. 
fl .- J11l1-1 JN VERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON LIBRARY 
discoverability applied to the facts of those cases. 7 Furthermore, McGrath, Henry, and 
(arguably) Gault JJ sought to preserve the possibility of extending the application of a 
reasonable discoverability by analogy, 8 while Tipping and Blanchard JJ did not. 
Several commentators have suggested this means it is still advisable for plaintiffs to 
argue reasonable discoverability ought to be extended to their particular situation,9 
and it clear from post-Murray case law such arguments are being made. 10 
In this paper I argue that the notion of extension by analogy does not sit 
comfortably with the doctrinal basis of these two decisions and therefore courts will 
very wary of extending the reach of reasonable discoverability beyond the confines of 
those cases. The basis of this argument is as follows. S v G and Searle can only be 
rationalised at a doctrinal level if they are regarded as recognition of a knowledge 
based test of accrual because in those cases knowledge or reasonable discoverability 
could not be brought within the substantive elements of the cause of action. If a 
knowledge based test is rejected, as it was in Murray, the doctrinal foundations of 
those cases start to break down and are better regarded as exceptions. The assertion 
these exceptions can be extended by analogy relies for authority on the common law 
approach, but as that approach is not the doctrinal basis of S v G and Searle it is 
argued the notion of extensions by analogy is not really appropriate. This will mean 
courts will be very wary of going beyond the narrow confines of the already 
established exceptions. Though legislative reform introducing a statutory reasonable 
discoverability test is hoped to be on the way in the near future, 11 presumably this will 
not apply retrospectively. The nature of latent damage means that questions of 
delayed knowledge will continue to arise under the present legislation for some time. 
7 S v G [ 1995] 3 NZLR 681 (CA) Cooke P, Richardson , Casey, Hardie Boys and Gault JJ. GD Searle & 
Co v Gunn [1996] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) Richardson P, Gault and Henry JJ [Searle]. 
8 Gault J's position is discussed at Part V C Extension By Analogy. 
9 Andrew Beck " Limitation in the Supreme Court" [2007] NZLJ 213 , 216 ; Hannah, Brown 
"' Reasonable Discoverability ' : the final word?" [2007] NZLJ I 83, 185. 
10 See for example Earl White v Attorney-Genera/ (28 November 2007) HC WN CIV 2001-485-864 
Miller J [Earl White]; National Pacific Commercial Equities Limited Formerly Known As Highwell 
Investment Group Limited (7 February 2008) HC AK CIV 2007-404-5832 Doogue JA [National 
Pacific]. 
11 Draft Limitation Defences Bill 2008 (an earlier version of which is available at 
www.lawcom .govt.nz/Upload Files/Publications) . 
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In Part II I discuss the functions and purposes of limitation law, and the 
Limitation Act 1950. Part III looks at the pre-Murray case law in England, Canada 
and New Zealand. Part IV sets out the reasoning of the j udgments in Murray, and part 
V analyses this reasoning. In Part VII I set out some concluding remarks. 
II LIMITATION LAW: FUNCTION AND PURPOSE 
A Function and Purpose 
Limitation law is a creature of statute "there being no principle of limitation at 
common law." 12 Its function is to bar an otherwise meritorious civil claim by setting a 
time when it can no longer be brought. 13 In New Zealand the Limitation Act 1950 has 
a core limitation period of six years. 14 Generally speaking limitation law is procedural 
in nature. It is said to bar a plaintiffs remedy and not his or her right. 
15 
In New 
Zealand for a limitation bar to be engaged it must be pleaded by the defendant and 
proven on the balance of probabilities. 
16 
The purposes of limitation law are not stated in the Limitation Act. However, 
the three main purposes of limitation law relate to certainty, evidence and diligence. 
17 
Certainty is regarded as the primary rationale of limitation law. 
18 It recognises 
it is unfair a defendant "should have a claim hanging over him [ or her] for an 
indefinite period and it is in this context that such enactments are sometimes described 
as 'statutes of peace ' ." 19 Apart from mitigating the harm to defendants of having 
12 Andrew McGee Limitation Periods (4 ed, Sweet & Maxwell , London, 2002) 2. Although the courts 
of equity invented a time defence through the doctrine of !aches. 
13 
Humphrey v Fainveather [1993) 3 NZLR 91 , (HC) Tipping J [Humphrey]. See also, Chris Corry 
Limitation Def ences in Civil Cases: Update Report for the law Commission (NZLC MP 16, 
Wellington , 2007) para 6. 
14 Limitation Act 1950, s 4. 
15 McGee, above n 12, 30 . However, there is a class of cases relating to land where the expiry of the 
limitation period extinguishes the right also. 
16 Humphrey, above n 13 , 99. 
17 Alan Rosenfeld "The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: The 
Equitable Estoppel Remedy" (1989) 12 Harv Women's LJ 206,211. See also, Michael A Jones 
"Latent Damage: Squaring the Circle" ( 1985) 48 MLR 564, 564 . This threefold classification was 
used in W v Attorney-General [ I 999) 2 NZLR 709 , para 79-81 (CA) Thomas J [ W v A-G] ; M (K) v 
M (H) [ 1992) 3 SCR 6, 29-30. 
18 W v A-G, above n 17 , para 77. 
19 Ibid , 16. 
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litigation hanging over them, there are at least two other policy considerations driving 
the need for certainty. The first is the general public interest of living in a non-
litigious society, or at least setting a definite time after which litigation may not be 
brought. In New Zealand, the particular weight given to the desirability of avoiding 
litigation is evident from the establishment of Accident Compensation Corporation in 
1974, and the consequent removal of the common law right to sue for personal 
mJury.20 
The second consideration is the deleterious economic effects of uncertainty. 
Graeme Mew suggests two possibilities.2
1 The first is the possibility open-ended 
liability may prevent, or provide a disincentive to, the entering into of transactions.
22 
The second is that "the cost of maintaining records for many years and obtaining 
adequate liability insurance is ultimately passed on to the consumer."
23 
The evidence rationale is an "objective consideration",
24 positing that trials 
should be held while evidence remains "fresh and reliable."
25 With the passage of 
time this becomes less likely because "[m]emories will fade, witnesses will die or 
move away, and documents and other records will be destroyed."
26 
The diligence rationale argues plaintiffs should be encouraged to commence 
litigation in a timely manner and not "sleep on their rights."
27 If a plaintiff fails to do 
so, limitation law will deny them a remedy. Considered in light of the other two 
rationales this seems entirely fair. However, the conundrum is how can a plaintiff be 
diligent if unaware of the facts giving rise to a claim? 
C Limitation Act 1950 
20 Now contained in the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation , and Compensation Act 200 I, s 317. 
21 Graeme Mew The law of Limitations (Butterworths, Vancouver, I 991) 7-8 . See also WS Schlosser 
"Some Recent Developments in the Law of Limitation of Actions, Concurrent Liability and Pure 
Economic loss" (1987) Alberta Law Rev 388, 388-389. 
22 Ibid, 7-8. 
23 Ibid, 7-8. 
24 Andrew McGee limitation Periods ( 4 ed, Sweet & Max we I I, London, 2002) 16. 
25 Rosenfeld , above n 17, 211. 
26 Mew, above n 21 , 7. See also McGee, above n 24, 16. 
27 M (K) v M (H) , above n 17 , 29-30 cited in Peixeiro v Haberman [ I 997] 3 SCR 549, para 34 
[Peixeiro] . 
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Section 4 of the Limitation Act states: 
4 Limitation of actions of contract and tort, and certain other actions 
(I) Except as otherwise provided in this Act or in subpart 3 of Part 2 of the 
Prisoners' and Victims ' Claims Act 2005, the following actions shall not be 
brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action 
accrued , that is to say, -
(a) Actions founded on simple contract or on tort 
(d) Actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment, other than a 
penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture. 
Cause of action has been defined at common law as "every fact which it would 
be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the 
judgment of the court."28 In contract this would be the existence of a contract and its 
subsequent breach.29 In negligence it would be the "facts necessary to establish duty, 
breach and consequent loss."30 The Limitation Act does not define when a cause of 
action has accrued, and as noted in the introduction the reasonable discoverability 
debate is about the appropriate meaning to be given to the phrase. 
III PRE-MURRAY CASE LAW 
In order to understand the differing views about the place of knowledge in 
limitation law an historical sketch and an analysis of the leading cases is needed. The 
following addresses case law from England, Canada and New Zealand because the 
judgments in Murray focus on these jurisdictions. English law is particularly pertinent 
because the New Zealand act is modelled on Limitation Act l 939 (UK). Although it is 
conceptually clearer to address the cases in relation to the approach to 'accrues' each 
takes, addressing them according to jurisdiction better illustrates the affect of English 
28 Read v Brown ( I 888) 22 QBD 128, 131 cited in Cartledge & Ors v E Jopling and Sons Ltd [ 1963] I 
All ER 341 , 352 Lord Pearce, and in Hamlin (CA), above n 4, 536 McKay J. 
29 Mew, above n 21 , 129. 
30 BP Oil New Zealand Ltd v Ports of Auckland Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 208, para 92 Rodney Hansen J [BP 
Oil] citing Stratford v Phillips Shayle-George (200 I) 15 PRNZ 573 , 578 (CA) [Stratford]. 
5 
decisions on the Canadian and New Zealand approaches and the different path each 
jurisdiction has taken. 
A England 
The House of Lords ruled on the meaning of accrued in Cartledge & Ors v E 
Jopling & Sons Ltd in a case concerning negligence causing personal injury.
31 The 
plaintiffs developed pneumoconiosis through the inhalation of dust when working in 
the defendant's factory and thus sustained damage, but did not discover this for at 
least six years. Framing the issue as one of statutory interpretation, the Limitation Act 
was held to lay down an occurrence based test of accrual. Once all the facts 
constituting the cause of action were in existence, the cause of action had accrued. 
Thus, the plaintiffs ' cause of action had accrued when they developed 
pneumoconiosis, and consequently the limitation period had expired. 
Lord Pearce, who gave the only fully reasoned speech, based his decision 
upon two factors. One, case law from the previous statute of 1623 has been decided 
on the basis accrual was occurrence based.
32 Two, his Lordship pointed to the addition 
of a fraudulent concealment provision in section 26 of the 1939 English Act (section 
28 of the New Zealand Act).33 It was reasoned that this exception by which time did 
not run until the fraud or mistake has been, or could with reasonable diligence have 
been discovered, meant that in ordinary circumstances time began to run when all the 
facts necessary to bring the cause of action were in existence.
34 All judges expressed 
regret that this was the decision they felt bound to reach and had it been a matter for 
the common law a different result would have been reached. 
35 
The English Parliament responded to the mischief occasioned by Cartledge by 
enacting the Limitation Act 1963, which amended the 1939 Act to exclude the 
operation of a limitation defence in personal injury cases where:
36 
3 1 Cartledge, above n 2, 343 . 
32 Ibid, 351 . 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid, 343. 
35 See Pirelli, above n 2, 14 Lord Fraser. 
36 Limitation Act 1963 (UK), s I (3) . 
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it is proved that the material facts relating to that cause of action were or included facts of 
a decisive character which were at all times outside the knowledge (actual or 
constructive) of the plaintiff. 
New Zealand did not follow suit with similar legislative reform.
37 
The issue of undiscovered damage was revisited in Sparham-Souter v Town 
and Counffy Developments. 38 This case concerned what was to become the familiar 
theme of damage to houses - resulting from inadequate foundations - not discovered 
until after the limitation period had expired. Negligence was alleged against the 
developer, who was also the builder, and against the council's surveyor. 
Cartledge was distinguished on the basis that the damage happened upon 
inhalation of dust whereas in Spar ham-Souter no damage was done to the "house until 
it began to sink and cracks appeared."39 It was ruled that in the case of defective 
foundations "[t]ime did not start to run against [the plaintiff] until [the plaintiff] 
knows of the defective foundations, or could, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered it."40 
Lord Denning MR, giving the leading judgment, did not engage in an analysis 
of what accrued means or the relevance of the fraud exception.
41 Rather, his 
Lordship's reasoning was to state two propositions. Firstly, a cause of action in 
negligence does not accrue until the plaintiff sustains damage as the result of the 
defendant's breach of his or her duty of care. Secondly, '"[a] Statute of Limitations 
cannot sta1i to run unless there are two things present - a party capable of suing and a 
party liable to be sued. "'42 Although "equivocal" on the point, 
43 his Lordship appears 
to assert the relevant damage is that to the defective foundations. He then argues a 
purchaser has sustained no loss, and therefore could not sue, until the house sank or 
37 Christine French "Time and the Blamelessly Ignorant Plaintiff; A Review of the Reasonable 
Discoverability Doctrine and Section Four of the Limitation Act 1950" (1998) 9 OLR 255 258. 
38 , 
Sparham-Souter, above n 4. 
39 Ibid , 868. 
40 Ibid, 868. 
4 1 Neither did Roskill or Geoffrey LJJ. 
42 Ibid, 867 citing Thomson v Lord C/anmorris [1900] 1 CH 718, 728-729 Vaughan Williams LJ. 
43 Christine French, above n 3 7, 259 at note 27. 
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cracks appear because before then the house could be sold for full value.
44 Therefore, 
time did not start to run until this damage was discovered or reasonably discoverable. 
Although not explicitly stated in this way by Lord Denning MR, Roskill, and 
Geoffrey LJJ it is submitted Sparham-Souter was the genesis of the common law 
approach because the issue of the plaintiffs knowledge was placed within the cause 
of action and was not considered a part of a statutory test. Indeed it was the genesis 
for reasonable discoverability in general, but as will be argued I have reservations 
about whether it provides a sound basis for a wider approach. 
The House of Lords was asked to resolve these authorities in Pirelli , a case of 
a defectively built chimney.4
5 Delivering the only substantive speech, Lord Fraser 
rejected Sparham-Souter. His Lordship argued Parliament's inclusion of a reasonable 
discoverability clause for personal injuries in the 1963 amendments meant Parliament 
was endorsing the application Cartledge in all other cases. His Lordship was careful 
to distinguish between a latent defect in foundations, and material damage resulting 
from these defects, but ruled that once damage is sustained time begins to run 
regardless of knowledge. Although economic loss and opposed to physical damage 
was a basis for distinguishing Sparham-Souter, his Lordship proceeded on the basis 
that what was being sued upon in all cases was physical damage. 
Echoing a familiar concern Lord Fraser said changes to limitation law were 
the province of Parliament. In particular his Lordship was concerned the absence of a 
longstop provision, placing an ultimate time limit on the bringing of an action, could 
leave liability potentially open ended if a reasonable discoverability rule was 
recognised.46 In response to Pirelli the UK Parliament amended the Limitation Act 
1980 so that in actions in negligence not concerning personal injury, the time limit 
was six years from accrual or if six years had passed three years from:
47 
44 Jones, above n 17, 565 . 
45 Pirelli, above n 2. 
46 Ibid, 19. See also Lord Scarman, 19 . 
47 Limitation Act 1980 (UK), s 14A. 
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the earliest date on which the plaintiff or any person in whom the cause of action was 
vested before him first had both the knowledge required for bringing an action for 
damages in respect of the relevant damage and a right to bring such an action . 
Once again New Zealand did not follow with similar reform. 
B Canada 
In Kam/oops v Nielsen, another case of defective foundations, the Canadian 
Supreme Court was faced with a situation where the Court of Appeal for British 
Columbia had applied Sparham-Souter, but since then the House of Lords ruled on 
the issue in Pirelli. 48 The Court was thus asked to decide which approach Canada 
would adopt. Wilson J, delivering judgment for the majority, ruled Canada would 
follow Spar ham-Souter and endorsed a reasonable discoverability of dan1age test. 
While identifying the approach in Cartledge was one of statutory 
interpretation, her Honour did not analyse the language of the relevant limitation 
provision. Section 738(2) of the Municipal Act 1960 required an action be brought 
within one year "after the cause of action shall have arisen".49 No attempt was made 
to distinguish Cartledge and Pirelli on the basis of a lack of a concealed fraud 
provision, probably because an overlapping enactment the "the Statute of Limitations 
(RSBC) 194, c 191 , afforded a similar basis for an argument as to legislative intent in 
s 38 ."50 Instead her Honour weighed the harm to either party. On the one hand, it was 
unjust a plaintiffs claim is stature-barred before he or she knows of its existence. On 
the other hand, the "postponement of the accrual of a cause of action until the date of 
discoverability may involve the courts in the investigation of facts many years after 
their occurrence."
51 She concluded the latter harm "to be much the lesser of two 
evils. "52 
Wilson J said she was applying the rule from Sparham-Souter that "the 
limitation period starts to run from the date on which the plaintiff actually discovers 
48 Kam/oops, above n 3. 
49 Municipal Act RS BC 1960, s 738(2). 
50 Rafuse, above n 3, para 76 Le Dain J. 
51 Kam/oops, above n 3, 40. 
52 Ibid , 40 . 
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the damage or should with reasonable diligence have discovered it."
53 However, 
Sparham-Souter was decided on the basis that no damage was sustained until it was 
discovered or reasonably discoverable. Here an ambiguous phrase was interpreted in a 
way felt best to accord with the interests of justice. Although the difficult issue of 
whether the relevant damage is the latent defect or the resultant damage to the 
building was addressed, 
54 the distinction between economic and physical damage was 
not. The relevant damage seemed to be physical damage meaning knowledge was not 
placed within the cause of action itself; rather it formed part of a statutory test of 
accrual. 
In Central Trust Company v Rafuse the Supreme Court revisited reasonable 
discoverability in the context of the professional negligence of solicitors. 
55 Le Dain J, 
delivering the judgment of the Court, affirmed the rule of reasonable discoverability 
and extended its reach, stating it is:
56 
a general rule that a cause of action arises for purposes of a limitation period when the 
material facts on which it is based have been discovered or ought to have been discovered 
by the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
In several respects this definition goes further than any previously adopted in 
either England or Canada. Firstly, in Kamloops the rule was said to apply to the 
damage element of negligence, whereas in Le Dain J's version it applies to any 
material fact and thus element of a cause of action. Secondly, the rule is not phrased 
in a way limiting it to causes of action in negligence. The Canadian position seems to 
be that it is a rule of general application with the possible exceptions of Alberta, 
British Columbia (because of the reform addressed in the next paragraph), and 
Manitoba. 57 In a later case it was described as a "rule of construction" applicable 
whenever the language of accrual is used. 
58 This seems to extend to claims in contract 
of indemnity also, but the Supreme Court is yet to rule on its application to contract 
53 Ibid, 36. 
54 Although not entirely clear, physical damage seemed to be considered the relevant damage. 
55 Rafuse, above n 3. 
56 Ibid, para 77. 
57 Mew, above n 2 1, I 05. 
58 Fehr v Jacob ( 1993) 14 CCL T (2d) 200, 206 (Man CA) Twaddle JA, approved by the Supreme 
Court in Peixeiro, above n 27, para 37. 
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simpliciter. 59 It is submitted the general tenor of the Canadian Supreme Court's 
position on this issue and the interests overall consistency suggests the rule does apply 
to claims in contract simpliciter. This is, of course, by no means a foregone 
conclusion. 
It should be noted also that Le Dain J argues it is implicit in Wilson J's 
judgment in Kam/oops that she rejected the notion the issue's resolution was best left 
to Parliament. 60 This underplays the likelihood Wilson J's willingness to recognise the 
rule was influenced by the introduction in British Columbia of the Limitation Act 
1975 which contained a reasonable discoverability rule and a 30 year longstop.
61 
Although it was not applicable Kam/oops it was in subsequent cases (though 
obviously only within British Columbia). 
C New Zealand 
In Hamlin the New Zealand Court of Appeal confirmed the application of a 
reasonable discoverability rule in New Zealand in the context of defective 
foundations. 62 Although the issue had arisen in New Zealand earlier, this was the first 
case to rule decisively on the point. 63 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Cooke P argued "the 
present case does not really turn on statutory interpretation. The Limitation Act does 
not define when a cause of action arises: it leaves that question to the common law."
64 
Cooke P acknowledged that the statutory interpretation approach adopted in 
Cartledge was one rationally open.65 However, he rejected the concealed fraud 
provision argument stating "that does not have to be treated as implying any 
legislative understanding, still less any legislative enactment, about when a particular 
59 Mew, above n 21 , 134. 
60 Raji,se, above n 3, para 76. 
61 Limitation Act S BC 1975 c 37, s 6 and s 8( I) respectively. 
62 Hamlin (CA) (McKay J dissenting) , above n 4. Richardson J's judgment is not discussed as it 
focused solely on the issue of tort liability of local authorities and concurred with the majority on the 
limitation issue. 
63 See Mount A fb ert Borough Council v Johnson [ 1979] 2 NZLR 23 (CA); Askin v Knox [ 1989] 1 
NZLR 248 (CA). 
64 Hamlin (CA), above n 4, 523 . 
65 Ibid . 
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cause of action arises at common law."66 Casey J went even further, describing the 
argument as non sequitur.67 
Rather than recognising a general rule, Cooke P "prefer[red) to proceed step 
by step."68 Without saying so he followed in the footsteps of Lord Denning MR by 
ruling, 69 "time runs from date when a significant defect in the foundations is or ought 
tp have been discovered."70 His Honour explicitly recognised that in defective 
foundations cases this analysis was assisted by recognising the damage as economic 
because "until then the defect is latent and the market value of the property has not 
been diminished by it." 71 The same economic loss argument was endorsed by Casey 
and Gault JJ. 72 Although at the end of Cooke P's judgment he states a wider 
formulation of the rule referring to the discovery of defective foundations, 
73 and not 
damage upon discovery, it is submitted this must be read in light of the overall 
discussion and its underlying rationale of economic loss. 
Understanding the nature of Cooke P's reasoning is the key to understanding 
the claim being made in this paper. For Cooke P, accrual depended on the substantive 
law of the cause of action at issue not on any statutory test. In Hamlin reasonable 
discoverability could be brought within the substantive law of a cause of action so 
was considered applicable. It is submitted that in saying it was a matter for the 
common law and the court ought to proceed step by step, his Honour meant the 
further application of the rule would depend on whether a suitable analogy could be 
drawn between the facts of Hamlin and other cases in negligence. So, for instance, it 
would need to be shown that issues of knowledge were relevant to the existence of the 
facts necessary to constitute the cause of action. 
74 
66 Ibid, 523 . See also the comments of Casey J, 532. For a less restrained critique of the argument 
based on the concealed fraud provision argument see Sir Robin Cooke "Tort and Contract '' in PD 
Finn (ed) Essays on Contract (Law Book Company, North Ryde (NSW), 1987) 222, 226. 
67 Hamlin (CA), above n 4, 532. 
68 Ibid, 522 . 
69 Chris Chapman " Limitation of Actions" [ 1996] NZLJ 161 , 162 . 
70 Hamlin (CA), above n 4, 522 . 
7 1 Ibid , 522. 
72 Hamlin (CA), above n 4, Casey J, 533 and Gault J, 534. 
73 Ibid , 524 . 
74 Cooke ' s view of accrual may partly explain his argument for negligence being recognised as a head 
of law in its on right regardless of whether the duty of care arises in to1t, contract, or otherwise. That 
way, reasonable discoverability, as a part of the cause of action itself, would have a much wider bite. 
12 
Although not applicable to the proceedings in Hamlin, like in Kamloops it is 
likely the majority's willingness to recognise the rule was influenced by the 
introduction of section 91 of the Building Act 1991 which set a ten-year longstop on 
claims. 75 In the earlier case Askin v Knox Cooke P expressed concern about 
recognising the rule in the absence of a longstop and noted only Parliament could 
introduce one. 76 
McKay J, dissenting, argued the matter was one of statutory interpretation and 
New Zealand ought to follow the occurrence based test set in Cartledge. However, he 
was not convinced by the fraudulent concealment argument. Rather, he pointed out " if 
all the necessary facts are in existence, it is difficult to say that the cause of action has 
not accrued merely because the plaintiff is not aware of them."
77 For McKay J 
knowledge was not one of those facts. 
When analysed closely, the debate between the majority and McKay J really 
seemed to be more about what facts constitute the cause of action than a disagreement 
about the meaning of the Limitation Act. Despite Cooke P's disavowal of the 
application of a statutory test, his approach is not inconsistent with the existence of 
one in that it is still about the facts which must occur before a cause of action accrues. 
This difference in approach is really one of focus. 
Hamlin was appealed to the Privy Council on the basis that Pirelli should have 
been applied. 78 Delivering judgment, Lord Lloyd of Berwick essentially confirmed 
the approach of the majority of the Court of Appeal. His Lordship explained more 
clearly why economic damage is said to occur when the defective foundations are 
reasonably discoverable to the homeowner. This is because "defects would then be 
obvious to a potential buyer, or his expert".
79 Defining damage as economic meant 
any definitive ruling on the status of Pirelli or a general rule of reasonable 
His Honour sets out this argument extra-judicially in "Tort and Contract", above n 66 . A brie f mention 
of it is made in Askin v Knox, above n 63 , 254 . 
75 Now in the Building Act 2004, s 393. 
76 Askin v Knox, above n 63 , 256. 
77 Hamlin (CA), above n 4 , 538 . 
78 Hamlin (PC), above n 4. 
79 Ibid , 526 . 
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discoverability was unnecessary. 80 This approach was not without its critics because it 
failed to account for the fact damages in tort for economic loss can be calculated not 
only for diminution in value but also for remedial work.
81 
It is important to note that in Murray, Tipping, McGrath and Gault JJ all 
suggest that in Hamlin the Privy Council recognised a narrower test than the Court of 
Appeal. 82 The Court of Appeal is said to have laid out a rule that a cause of action in 
negligence does not accrue until the defects were discovered, or reasonably 
discoverable, whereas the Privy Council by defining the loss of as economic kept the 
discoverability rule within the cause of action itself. Although there is dicta in Hamlin 
supporting this wider framing of the ratio, 83 the above analysis, and other 
commentators, have suggested that the Court of Appeal decided the issue on the same 
"narrow basis" of economic loss. 84 
In S v G a full bench of the Court of Appeal was asked to extend reasonable 
discoverability to a case concerning psychological injury. 
85 This appeal came before 
the Court prior to the Privy Council delivering its judgment in Hamlin. The causes of 
action were in negligence, trespass to the person and breach of fiduciary duty. The 
actions arose from alleged medical neglect, sexual, physical and emotional abuse. In 
this case, however, the psychological damage was already known to the victim, but at 
first instance it was accepted that in sexual abuse cases the causal connection to the 
abuse is often not known until therapy is undertaken, and this is was a case of this 
kind. 
Gault J, delivering the judgment of the Court stated "that a cause of action 
accrues when all of its elements are subsisting."
86 However, it is postponed, inter alia, 
when "the plaintiff reasonably has not discovered all of the elements (Jnvercargill 
80 Ibid , 526-527. 
81 See Chapman, above n 69, 161 ; New Zealand Law Commission Limitation of Civil Actions: A 
discussion paper (PP39, Wellington, 2000), para 27 ; French, above n 37, 261 . Contrast Mullany, above 
n I , 227 . 
82 Murray, above n 6, Tipping J, para 44 ; McGrath J, para 96; Gault J, para 111. 
83 Hamlin (CA), para 523 Cooke P. 
84 This includes Christine French who acted as counsel for the plaintiff in Hamlin . See French, above 
n 3 7, 260 and 264 . See also Chapman, above n 69, l 62 . 
85 S v G, above n 7. 
86 Ibid , 686. 
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City Council v Hamlin)."87 This formulation of the rule is clearly much wider than 
that recognised by the Court of Appeal or the Privy Council in Hamlin.
88 
Its wording 
parallels that the Canadian cases which framed the matter as one of a construction. 
89 
However, Gault J stated it was not a matter of statutory interpretation, rather, "[i]t is a 
question of when as a matter of law the cause of action accrues for the purposes of the 
Limitation Act."90 He then drew an analogy between a home owner who has seen 
some cracks around the house but has not, and could not reasonably have, discovered 
the defective foundations, and a sexual abuse victim who despite knowing of the 
abuse "reasonably has not linked serious psychological and emotional damage to the 
abuse."91 Such plaintiffs, he argued, did not have their cause of action accrue until 
"the psychological damage is or reasonably should have been identified and linked to 
the abuse. "92 
His Honour accepted the same rule applies to knowledge of consent in relation 
the causes of action in assault and battery.93 This was significant because the issue of 
discoverability was now considered applicable beyond negligence to a per se cause of 
action. Reasonable discoverability in relation to consent has subsequently been 
applied cases such as S v Attorney-General. 
94 
Although Gault J's approach was to proceed by analogy it is submitted it 
cannot be said that causation requires knowledge in the same way as economic loss, 
so that knowledge remains within the cause of action itself The cause is there, 
whether known or not. This means, despite comments to the contrary, the application 
of the rule in S v G was much closer to that of Rafuse than Hamlin. As French points 
out, the use of the word "postpone" represents a movement away from "the realm of 
the common law and into the imposing a gloss on the clear words of a statute. "
95 It is 
submitted the postpone position sits in an uneasy limbo between accrual being a 
matter for the common law and it being a statutory test. 
87 Ibid , 686 (citation omitted). 
88 This is so, even if it is accepted the Court of Appeal's formulation was wider than the Privy 
Council ' s. 
89 French, above n 37, 264. 
90 S v G, above n 7, 687. 
91 Ibid , 687. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid . 
94 S v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 450 paras 30-39. ~ , 
French, above n 37 , 264. 
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Subsequent to S v G and the Privy Council decision in Hamlin the Court of 
Appeal was asked to rule on reasonable discoverability in GD Searle & Co v Gunn.9
6 
This case alleged negligence causing physical injury. The respondent had an 
intrauterine device inserted, which as a result of pain was removed after a couple of 
weeks. Not long after this she was diagnosed with pelvic inflammatory disease which 
led to a number of ectopic pregnancies and eventually infertility. The link between the 
insertion of the device and the disease was not discovered until the respondent read 
about it in a magazine. At the time the link was discovered, the elements of the cause 
of action had already occurred and the limitation period had ostensibly expired. 
Henry J, delivering judgment for the Court confirmed that reasonable 
discoverability applied to the element of causation in this case also. After noting that S 
v G took the Hamlin principle "one step further and applied it to a personal injury 
claim of a specific kind",97 his Honour stated:98 
[i]t is still a question of what is meant in s 4 by ' the date on which the cause of action 
accrued. ' The phrase must be given a consistent meaning which is applicable to differing 
factual situations. 
The framing of the issue as one of statutory interpretation marked a clear shift 
from the decidedly common law approach of Hamlin and a further step from the 
"postpone" position of S v G. Admittedly, the discussion that follows is carefully 
restricted to accrual in personal injury claims.99 However, although there 1s no 
sweeping statement about a new breadth for the rule like that in Canada, if the 
definition of accrued is a matter of statutory interpretation, as a matter of principle, 
the meaning given to it should be applied consistently throughout the Limitation 
Act. 100 Although as Rodney Hansen J noted in BP Oil the weight of High Court 
authority was against any further extension, his Honour argued S v G and Searle 
represented a convergence with the Canadian approach. 
101 In light of the logic of 
96 Searle, above n 7. 
97 ]bid 132 
98 Ibid: 132: 
99 New Zealand Law Commission Tidy ing the Limitation Act (NZLC R6 l, Wellington, 2000) para I 0. 
10° French, above n 3 7, 277. 
101 BP Oil, above n 30, para I 04. 
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Searle and Rodney Hansen J's comments proponents of extending the application of 
the rule had reason to believe this is where New Zealand was heading. 
D Summary of Pre-Murray Case Law 
There are three possible approaches to the relevance of knowledge to accrual 
which have a clear doctrinal basis. As Cooke P recognised the statutory interpretation 
approach 1s one rationally open. 
102 It is submitted the ambiguity of the statutory 
language 1s such as to support either the English occurrence based test or the 
Canadian knowledge based test. The Hamlin common law approach is a legitimate 
one also , notwithstanding the critique of the reasoning in that particular case, 
103 in 
that one of the facts constituting the cause of action is knowledge or reasonable 
discoverability of damage. However, it is very difficult to rely on the underlying 
doctrinal basis of Hamlin to extend the reach ofreasonable discoverability. Just which 
approach S v G and Searle fell within was not entirely clear, there being a good 
argument they indicated the recognition of a general doctrine. 
IV MURRAYv MOREL: RESOLUTION AT LAST? 
A chance to resolve this issue was presented to the Supreme Court in Murray, 
the pertinent facts of which are briefly set out below. In a case like the Murray, where 
five individual judgments with differing reasoning are delivered, discerning a single 
ratio is problematic. Beck suggests the ratio can be summarised in three points.
104 
Firstly, there is no general doctrine of reasonable discoverability in New Zealand. 
Secondly, S v G and Searle should not be overruled. Thirdly, the application of the 
reasonable discoverability rule "might be extended beyond the situations accepted in S 
v G and Searle & Co on a case by case basis: McGrath, Gault, Henry JJ."
105 Though 
this is last point is probably correct and has been accepted in several subsequent 
judgments, 
106 my concerns with it are considered below.
107 Beck also notes Gault and 
102 See text above n 65. 
103 See text above n 69 . 
104 Beck, above n 9,215. 
105 Ibid, 215. This formulation has subsequently been applied in National Pacific, above n I 0, para 40 ; 
Earl White, above n J 0, para 405. 
106 Ibid. 
107 See Part V C Extension by Analogy. 
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Henry JJ are not permanent members of the Supreme Court Bench so it is unclear the 
Supreme Court would deal with the issue in the same way in future cases.
108 A recent 
obiter comment of Elias CJ in a case concerning negligent professional advice, 
suggested she may have been willing to consider an "extension of the approach 
adopted in the case of latent damage to buildings in Jnvercargill City Council v 
Hamlin", 109 if it had been material to the outcome of the limitation point. What the 
C~ief Justice meant by the approach adopted in Hamlin remains to be seen. 
The pertinent facts for this analysis are as follows. Section 56 of the Securities 
Act 1978 allows investors who subscribe based on untrue statements to recover 
subscriptions along with interest and compensation. In 1994 the Murrays, along with 
other investors, subscribed for securities in a forestry scheme on the basis of a 
prospectus which they alleged contained untrue statements. The Murrays did not 
discover the untrue statements until 1999 (just over six years since the statements 
were made). The statement of claim sought, inter alia, compensation pursuant to 
section 56. As this was an action "to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any 
enactment", 110 and had occurred more than six years since the claim was brought, it 
was ostensibly time barred under section 4(1 )( d) of the Limitation Act. 
Two issues were raised on appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision to 
reinstate eight of the ten causes of action struck out by the High Court. The first was 
the validity of allotments made under section 28 of the Securities Act. The Supreme 
Court ruled the allotments were valid, which reduced the remaining causes of action 
to one for breach of fiduciary duty and one under section 56 of the Securities Act. The 
second issue, which is the focus of this paper, was whether the Murrays could rely on 
a general doctrine of reasonable discoverability to save the ostensibly time-barred 
cause of action under section 56. 
The remainder of this part outlines the reasoning of the judgments, which are 
grouped according to their views about the possibility of extension. Firstly, the 
judgments in favour of further extension are discussed, which are further divided into 
108 Elias CJ recused herself and Anderson J sat on the Court of Appeal in this case. See 
Beck, above n 9, 213. 
109 Thom v Davys Burton, above n 4, para 15. 
110 Limitation Act, s 4(J)(d). 
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the approach of McGrath and Henry JJ, then that of Gault J.
111 Following this, the 
reasoning behind Blanchard and Tipping JJ's unwillingness to extend the application 
of the rule is discussed. Dealing with the judgments in this way narrows the 
discussion of the judgments to the reasoning underlying arguments for and against 
further extension. 
A McGrath and Henry JJ 
McGrath and Henry JJ did not express concern about the status of Searle and S 
v G in light of the Privy Council decision in Hamlin. McGrath J noted the Privy 
Council did not rule on the issue of reasonable discoverability beyond the particular 
facts of Hamlin, so "the Court of Appeal remained free in Searle when the question 
arose to apply the enlightened approach it had taken in Hamlin and S v G. "
112 Henry J 
expressly declined to engage in the debate about the basis of S v G and Searle 
saying: 11 3 
[ w Jhether or not the rationale of these those two judgments can be supported by an 
analysis such as that carried out by Tipping J or as being an adoption of Cooke P' s 
reference in lnvercargi/1 City Council v Hamlin to preferably proceeding step any step, I 
am satisfied they do not form an adequate basis or springboard to warrant acceptance of a 
general principle. 
McGrath J agreed these decisions did not "[lay] down reasonable discoverability as a 
generally applicable principle in New Zealand tort law."
11 4 
McGrath J argued that in the absence of Parliamentary action the rules "further 
application "remains a matter of judgement to be made in particular situations having 
regard to decided cases and analogies that can be fairly drawn from them. 
11 5 Henry J 
did not state this to be his preference, but expressly declined to consider whether a 
reasonable discoverability test applied in Murray because "no argument specific to the 
111 The same division is used by Brown, above n 9. Contrast Beck, above n 9; 
112 Murray, above n 6, para I 00 . 
113 Ibid , para 148 
11 4 Ibid 101 
11 5 Ibid: par~ I 00 . 
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pleaded causes of action" was made. 116 As Beck notes, "that must mean that it would 
be legally possible for such an argument to be made". 117 
McGrath J, despite there being no specific argument considered whether the 
rule ought to be applied to section 56. He proceeded in a way that appears similar to 
Wilson Jin Kam/oops noting that when deciding to apply the rule: 
118 
it must be borne in mind that the unfairness to plaintiffs, if damage is treated as arising 
before they knew or ought to have known it, in some situations will be matched and 
outweighed if allegations of wrongful conduct can be raised many years after what is 
complained of happened. 
His Honour concluded the rule did not apply to the "statutory tort" created by 
section 56 of the Securities Act, because to do so "without limitation, to my mind, has 
the potential to create great unfairness to the issuers of securities, in particular where 
there is volatility over time in the value of investments."
11 9 On this basis he concluded 
there was no analogy between Murray and the preceding cases and therefore 
reasonable discoverability did not apply. 
B Gault J 
Gault J was the only judge to consider it appropriate to apply reasonable 
discoverability to the cause of action in Murray. His Honour stated: 
120 
[i]n my view it is preferable to adopt some flexibility in interpreting when the cause of 
action accrues under s 4 of the Limitation Act according to particular causes of action 
where that serves the ends of justice . .. Of course the matter must be approached in a 
principled way but I find no difficulty in the proposition for New Zealand that a cause of 
action has not arisen when a plaintiff does not know and cannot reasonably ascertain that 
a claim exists. I am well aware that the position of potential defendants must be 
considered but in my view the balance is in favour of the ignorant plaintiff. 
11 6 Ibid, 148. Perhaps a little unfair in the sense counsel were instructed by Tipping J to pitch their oral 
argument to the recognition ofa general rule, see the trial transcript, 72 . Available at 
http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/from/transcripts/supreme.html (Accessed June 19 2008). 
11 7 Beck, above n 9, 215. 
11 8 Ibid, para 10 I. 
11 9 Ibid, para I 02 . 
120 Murray, above n 6, para 115 . 
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Two points arise from this. One, Gault J seems to be reconsidering the view he 
took in S v G that the issue was not one of statutory interpretation.
121 Two, it is not 
clear whether his Honour was saying the rule should be applied in this particular case 
only, or in general. He started by saying it depends on the particular cause of action, 
but the rule is stated in a much balder form. That his Honour viewed the rule as one of 
general application is supported by his comments that a return to Cartledge should be 
avoided and "this Court should not turn back from the development through the New 
Zealand cases culminating in Searle ."
122 Gault I's approach is thus more in line with, 
if not the same as, the Canadian position. 
C Tipping and Blanchard JJ 
Tipping J argued there was no general doctrine of reasonable discoverability in 
New Zealand, a point Blanchard J concurred with without giving separate reasons.
123 
Tipping J argued that, since at least the time of Cartledge the Limitation Act has been 
regarded as laying down an occurrence based test of accrual, and the concealed fraud 
provision is a strong indicator of this.
124 Hamlin dealt with knowledge or 
discoverability by placing this within the cause of action itself, but before the Privy 
Council could rule decisively on this point the Court of Appeal drawing on its 
decision in Hamlin chose in S v G to apply a qualitatively different version of 
reasonable discoverability to the elements of causation and consent. This approach 
placed a 'gloss ' on the established meaning of accrual which his Honour considered 
unsupported by the ratio of the Privy Council decision in Hamlin or the established 
meaning of accrual. 
125 He rejected dicta of Rodney Hansen J in BP Oil that this move 
represented a convergence with the Canadian general rule of construction.
126 
121 Contrast Brown, above n 9, 185, who argues the Judges in Murray "have remained consistent in 
their view of the law." 
J?2 - Murray, above n 6, para 114. 
123 Ibid, para 2. 
124 Ibid, para 66. 
125 As already addressed, his Honour did not go so far as to suggest that the approach in S v C was not 
justified in light of the Court of Appeal judgment in Hamlin . 
126 BP Oil, above n 30, para I 04 . 
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Tipping and Blanchard JJ viewed both S v G and Searle as exceptions.
127 
Although neither wished to overrule those decisions because of the injustice this 
would occasion "on the limited number of plaintiffs who may be relying upon S v G 
or Searle", 128 they did not believe their application should be extended beyond the 
fact pattern of the cases. 
129 Tipping J argued if they are exceptions, rather than a basis 
for a general doctrine, it was necessary to provide alternative basis on which to justify 
them. 130 Blanchard J was not convinced such a basis existed, 
131 arguing the decisions 
needed to be understood in their context. He argued New Zealand limitation law had 
not been amended as it had in England, so the Court felt able to interpret the 
Limitation Act as including a reasonable discoverability component where the 
application of Cartledge would have been "so repugnant to justice that they could not 
I "2 countenance it." ., Furthermore his Honour pointed out reforms of the Injury 
Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 to cover persons in S v G1 33 
and Searle 134 type situations limited the application of those cases in the future. 
Tipping J argued the exceptions can be rationalised on the following bases 
(but qualifies this by saying other bases might be available also). He argued that in S v 
G the fiduciary duty and the duty of care in negligence were essentially the same.
135 
Furthermore, breach of fiduciary duty is an equitable cause of action, and equitable 
actions are not subject to statutory limitation periods. This gave the Court of Appeal 
licence to make an exception to the usual occurrence rule because even if the cause of 
action in negligence was barred, the cause of action arising out of the same duty in 
equity was not. His Honour then concluded a claim for breach of a duty of care by a 
fiduciary causing bodily injury: 
136 
127 Murray, above n 6, para 63. Though his Honour does not use the word exception, the surrounding 
discussion suggests this how he regarded S v G and Searle. 
128 Ibid, para 5 Blanchard J. 
129 Ibid, para 77. 
130 Ibid. 
13 1 Ibid, para 3. 
132 Ibid, para 4. 
133 Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 200 I, s 21 A. 
134 Ibid, s 20(2) read with s 32. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid , para 80. 
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... can properly be regarded as not accruing until the link between the wrongdo
er's 
conduct and the plaintiffs damage is known to or ought to be known to the plain
tiff. 
Indeed, on this basis s 4 would not apply as it is directed at common law claims in tort.
 
Thus in Tipping J's view S v G only remained good law in analogous factu
al 
situations involving a breach of fiduciary duty, and not for any claim boug
ht 
additionally or solely for a breach of a duty arising in tort. He argued that section 4(
9) 
of the Limitation Act, whereby actions in equity analogous to those barred by the A
ct 
are barred also, can be applied "on a basis which recognises the need for a reasonab
le 
discoverability approach."
137 
His Honour admitted to having greater trouble reconciling the decision in 
Searle. He suggests that if it is possible, like in Hamlin , to place discoverabili
ty 
within the cause of action the rule applies. Therefore, in Searle type cases, a
n 
action: 138 
would not exist unless and until the plaintiff knows or ought to know that there is a cau
sal 
link between the defendant' s conduct and the harm suffered by the plaintiff. If men
tal 
harm is the foundation of the claim that could be said to justify making a distinction fr
om 
the ordinary position that applies to physical harm. 
The question of whether these cases provide a compelling justification for the 
exceptions is discussed in the next part. 
139 
V ANALYSIS 
A The Doctrinal Question: a Debate Worth Having? 
Against this backdrop, the first question that needs addressing is, is the 
doctrinal debate one worth having? Few people, if anyone, familiar with the facts of
 S 
v G or Searle would disagree that justice in those cases favoured allowing th
e 
plaintiffs to seek a remedy in a court of law. An attempt therefore to analyse th
e 
underlying foundations of these cases, like that in this paper, is susceptible to criticis
m 
137 Ibid . 
138 Ibid, para 81. 
139 Part V D Justifying S v G and Searle. 
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for focusing too heavily on legal niceties and not giving the Court of Appeal sufficient 
credit for breaking new ground. 140 This argument has weight. The problem is that the 
Court of Appeal, in its willingness to extend the rule's application, was probably 
operating on the assumption these developments would be met with attendant 
legislative reform like in England and to an extent Canada.
141 While there has been 
some ad hoe reform, the Limitation Act has remained unchanged. This has led to 
attempts by plaintiffs in different factual scenarios to have the rule applied to them. 
Thus, courts in New Zealand have had to grapple with the underlying doctrinal basis 
of the rule culminating in the issue being place before the Supreme Court in 
142 Murray. 
This part first addresses the rejection of a general doctrine of reasonable 
discoverability. It then critiques the assertion the extension of S v G and Searle is 
possible through a process of analogy. From here it turns to Tipping J's alternative 
rationalisations of those cases and concludes these are unconvincing. 
B No General Doctrine 
The rejection of an across the board doctrine of reasonable discoverability was 
a course rationally open to the Supreme Court. The weight of authority seems to 
favour an occurrence based test. 143 It is possible, like in Canada, to interpret the 
Limitation Act as setting down a test of accrual that includes a reasonable 
discoverability component. French argues, "[t]o say a cause of action ' accrues' when 
the damage is reasonably discoverable does not in anyway do violence to the word 
'accrues'." 144 Additionally, the fraudulent concealment provision argument is at best 
equivocal. Then again, in the absence of a statutory longstop, the reluctance to 
interpret 'accrues' this way is understandable; particularly in light of the certainty and 
evidentiary rationales. Although other controls might be available such as the High 
140 See Beck, above n 9, 2 I 6. 
14 1 Murray, above n 6, para 4 Blanchard J; para 69 Tipping J. 
142 See for instance BP Oil, above n 30 ; Stratford, above n 30; Jackson v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) (29 
October 1998) HC AK NP 1447/97, Paterson J; Saunders & Co v Bank of New Zealand [2002] 2 
NZLR 270, O'Regan J; Pangani Properties Ltd v Owens Transport Ltd (9 July 2002) HC AK CP 332-
SDO I , Williams J; Bomac Laboratories Ltd F Hojjinan-la Roche Ltd (2002) 7 NZBLC I 03 ,627 
Harrison J. 
143 Murray, above n 6, para 69 Tipping J; Beck, above n 9, 216. 
144 French, above n 37, 258. 
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Court Rules relating to strike out, 
145 a modified version of !aches, 
146 the passage of 
time, 147 and the requirement of reasonable diligence, 
148 none are particularly 
convincing or provide the certainty of a statutory longstop. Additionally, there may be 
wider policy implications of extending the rule beyond the confines of tort law that 
are better considered by Parliament. Indeed wider policy concerns were a significant 
factor in McGrath I's reluctance to extend the rule to section 56 of the Securities 
Act.149 
C Extension by Analogy 
Before turning to a critique of the fow1dations of extension by analogy, it is 
worth considering whether Gault I's judgment supported this approach. He certainly 
supported the extension of the approach, but his basis for so holding was quite 
different to McGrath and Henry JJ ' s. It was much closer to a rule of general 
application, indeed the editors of the New Zealand Law Reports record his Honour as 
dissenting on the rejection of a general doctrine of reasonable discoverability.
150 This 
raises an interesting question of the permissibility, as a matter of principle, of relying 
on Gault I's endorsement of a general test as authority for an extension by analogy 
approach. With this concern raised the paper proceeds on the basis this is a legitimate 
step to take. 
Moving now to the doctrinal issue, the problem with applying the extension of 
the exceptions by analogy is as follows . The incrementalist approach advocated by 
Cooke P in Hamlin was based on a line of reasoning that regarded the accrual of a 
common law cause of action a matter for the courts to decide. If an element of the 
cause of action required knowledge or the reasonable discoverability of it, then this 
could be incorporated into the substantive law of the cause of action. Moreover, 
145 High Court Rules, rr 186 and 477. See Ministry of Economic Development " Business Law Reform 
Bill - Clause 20 - Summary" (5 September 2000) para 20. Discussed in the context of the inclusion of 
a reasonable discoverability rule in the Fair Trading Act 1986 which does not have a longstop 
provision. For a critique of this suggestion see New Zealand Law Commission Tidy ing Up the 
limitation Act (NZLC R6 I, Wellington , 2000) para 18. 
146 Schlosser, above n 21 , 397. For a critique of this suggestion see French, above n 37, 284. 
147 Peixeiro v Haberman (1995) 42 CPC (3d) 37, para 15. 
148 Murray, above n 6, para 116. 
149 Ibid , McGrath J, para 102 and Henry J, paras 144-145 . 
150 Murray, above n 6, para 2 of the headnote. Contrast Brown, above 9, 185. 
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common law method meant that courts could reason by analogy that knowledge was 
relevant to the occurrence of the elements of other causes of action. The problem 
faced by the Court of Appeal in S v G and Searle was it was not possible to place 
knowledge within the cause of action itself. Those cases must therefore either be 
exceptions to an occurrence based test, or evidence of a recognition of a 
discoverability based test. 151 The problem is if the answer is the former, then the 
assertion made in Murray that those cases can be applied in other cases by analogy 
draws its authority from an entirely different doctrinal foundation. Any extension of 
the rule is thus not based on common law reasoning by analogy but a policy choice of 
whether to extend an exception to an established statutory test. 
This problem raises a wider question about the role of the legal system which 
is worth mentioning, but can only be addressed briefly. That is, the law is all about 
making policy choices and the weighing of competing interests. 152 And no body is 
better suited than the judiciary to decide what course the common law ought to take. 
The application of reasonable discoverability in S v G, Searle and Hamlin and the 
denial of its application to section 56 of the Securities Act is a reflection of "[t]he 
law's greater protection of persons than property and property than merely economic 
interests." 153 The problem, however, is that limitation law is a creature of statute, and 
is essentially procedural in nature. The engaging in a weighing exercise on a case by 
case basis in regards to a procedural point does not sit comfortably with the 
recognition of an occurrence based statutory test of accrual. Furthermore, it 
undermines the rationale of certainty. 
These concerns are, in a way, reflective of a wider debate more commonly 
associated with public law about the degree to which the courts may depart from the 
established meaning of a statute in order to reach the desired result, 
154 particularly 
151 Cooke P was a member of the Bench in S v G suggesting he endorsed the reasoning in that decision, 
but this does not undermine the fact it represented a departure from the logic of Hamlin. 
152 See David M O'Brien "Of Judicial Myths, Motivations and Justifications : a postscript on social 
science and the law" (1981) 64 Judicature 285. 
153 Dicks v Hobson Swan Construction Ltd (22 December 2006) HC AK CIV 2004-404-1065, para 43 
Baragwanath J citing Naysmith v Accident Compensation Corporation [2006] I NZLR 40, para 80. 
154 Particularly in the Bill of Rights Act context. See R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR I (NZSC). See 
generally Claudia Geiringer "The Principle of Legality and the Bill of Rights: A Critical Examination 
of R v Hansen" (2008) 6 NZJPIL 59. 
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when the legislature has not "fulfil(led] its part of the constitutional bargain. " 
155 It 
also brings up the issue of the appropriate relationship between statute and the 
common law. Furthermore, when considering the unwillingness to recognise a general 
rule, it must also be kept in mind that the judgment in Murray came at a very early 
time in the Supreme Court ' s history, 
156 and it may have seemed like a rather radical 
step for such a new court to take. 
All this is not to say that McGrath and Henry JJ were not cognisant of the 
problems underlying extension by analogy and the wider issues at play, but rather 
they did not regard these issues as fatal to further extension. Perhaps this is acceptable 
as long as it is recognised that what is occurring is a form of 'judicial legislating' in 
order to remedy a problem caused by legislative inertia, and it is only restricted to the 
most pressing of cases. It may turn out that is all that was intended. However, that 
McGrath J was willing to consider whether the rules application to section 56 of the 
Securities Act suggests a willingness to extend reasonable discoverability beyond the 
confines of the current exceptions. I doubt this will happen because as Blanchard J 
notes S v G and Searle currently have very little practical application, so in the rare 
cases where they are applicable they will just be a continuation of a recognised 
exception. The moment they are used to support the extension of reasonable 
discoverability beyond the context of bodily injury, the same thorny issue of the 
doctrinal basis of doing so raises its head again. 
A further problem is that very little guidance is given on the how the choice to 
extend should be made. McGrath J engaged in weighing of the relative harms to 
litigants under section 56, and concluded that justice favours an occurrence based test. 
Gault J's weighing up, though at a greater level of generality, reached the opposite 
conclusion. 
D Justifying S v G and Searle 
155 Tom Weston " Limiting limitation (2)" [2007] NZLJ 169, 170. 
156 See Peter Blanchard "The Early Experience of the New Zealand Supreme Court" (2008) 6 N
ZJPIL 
175, 178. 
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If one regards these problems as fatal to any further extension, but wishes to 
retain the existing exceptions, then one can do as Tipping J did and rationalise them 
on alternative grounds. Like Blanchard J, for the reasons that follow I am not 
convinced these grounds are particularly compelling. Therefore, if the Supreme Court 
does tackle this issue again and decides the exceptions should stand but no further 
extension is appropriate Blanchard J's reasons for so holding should be preferred. 
Even if one accepts the logic Tipping J used to reach the fiduciary overlay 
argument, it is unclear a reasonable discoverability approach is applicable in equity. 
Generally, to succeed in a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary a plaintiff must 
show the existence of a fiduciary duty and a breach of that duty.
157 Although this 
cause of action not subject to a statutory time bar, the equitable doctrine of !aches 
requires due diligence "after there has been such notice or knowledge as to make it 
inequitable to lie by and not pursue that claim."
158 Thus a time limit of sorts will start 
to run, and the cause of action will, in a sense, accrue, once the plaintiff has 
knowledge or notice. There is room for the argument reasonable discoverability is 
synonymous with notice. 159 However, this has to be reconciled with the general rule 
that "a defendant will not succeed with a plea of !aches if the plaintiff or claimant was 
unaware of its position." 160 Actual knowledge, therefore, seems to be the standard. 
Tipping J conceded Searle presents even greater difficulties. His suggestion 
that where reasonable discoverability of causation can be accommodated within the 
cause of action it might be applicable, at least has the advantage of doctrinal clarity in 
that it follows what this paper has argued is the Hamlin approach.
161 However, it is 
unclear this actually works in practice. The Court of Appeal was not able to do this 
convincingly in S v G or Searle which led to the problems under discussion. Of 
course, there is always the possibility of creative legal reasoning be employed in 
future cases in order to accommodate issues of knowledge and discoverability into the 
substantive law of a cause of action. 
157 The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2008) Equity, para 120. French makes a 
similar point in a different context, above n 37,284. 
158 Ibid, para 275. 
159 Mew, above 21, 25, 
160 Ibid . 
161 Notwithstanding the critique of the particular way this was achieved in Hamlin . 
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VII CONCLUSION 
If a knowledge or reasonable discoverability based test, or so called general 
doctrine of reasonable discoverability is rejected as applicable in New Zealand, then S 
v G and Searle must be regarded as exceptions to an occurrence based test. Extending 
what are exceptions to an occurrence based rule beyond the facts of those exceptions 
is a process that is lacking in a clear doctrinal foundation. The exceptions were carved 
out in the context of cases so compelling the courts felt they had no choice but to read 
a rule of reasonable discoverability into the statute for those particular cases. The 
practical application of those cases now is very limited, so there is not point in being 
overly troubled about the basis on which they were made. However, any further 
extension of the application of the rule recognised in these cases inevitably reopens 
the question of the doctrinal and precedential basis for doing so. In the end, the 
question whether to do so is a policy choice, and it may be a good thing that the 
Supreme Court has left itself the option of making further exceptions in the future. 
Litigants would be well advised not to pin their hopes on this happening even in what 
may be regarded as fairly analogous situations. Following Murray courts in New 
Zealand are likely to be very wary of reopening a question the ultimate resolution to 
which must come from Parliament. 
It is appears Parliament will soon remedy this state of affairs. This is the 
appropriate forum to weigh the competing rationales of limitation law and the wider 
policy implications of extending reasonable discoverability beyond its current 
confines. Hopefully this reform will lay foundations sturdy and flexible enough to 
future proof limitation law in New Zealand. 
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